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YANIV ROZNAI * 
“The fundamental principles of [a] society . . . are not the products of the 
law.  
They determine what the law is.”   
 
Richard S. Kay, Comparative Constitutional Fundamentals, 6 CONN. J. 
INT’L L. 445, 466 (1991).  
I. 
I am more than thrilled to introduce this issue celebrating the work of 
Prof. Richard S. Kay, the Wallace Stevens Professor of Law at the 
University of Connecticut School of Law (UConn Law). Prof. Kay joined 
the Law School faculty after clerking on the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts. He holds a B.A. from Brandeis University, an M.A. in 
economics from Yale University, and a J.D. from Harvard Law School. 
During his time at UConn Law, Prof. Kay has taught basic and advanced 
courses in constitutional law, comparative law, evidence, commercial law, 
and European Human Rights. From 2014 to 2016 he served as Associate 
Dean for Research and Faculty Development. He has held visiting 
professorships at Boston University School of Law, the University of 
Exeter, the University of San Diego School of Law, and Boston College 
Law School. Prof. Kay is an elected member of the International Academy 
of Comparative Law and is a past chair of the Constitutional Law Section 
of the Association of American Law Schools. Currently, he is the President 
of the American Society of Comparative Law. 
Prof. Kay’s contribution to constitutional law is enormous and it would 
be an impossible task to summarize it in this brief introduction. He has 
written over 50 articles and 17 book reviews, co-edited (with Anthony W. 
Bradley and Law School colleague Mark Weston Janis) a textbook on 
European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials now in its third edition 
with Oxford University Press, and one edited collection on Standing to 
Raise Constitutional Issues: Comparative Perspectives published by 
Bruylant. He also authored an important monograph: The Glorious 
                                                                                                                     
* Associate Professor; Harry Radzyner Law School, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. I would 
like to take advantage of this star note and thank Rick Kay for his contribution, support, and 
inspiration.     
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Revolution and the Continuity of Law, published by the Catholic 
University of America Press, which is a historical study of the relationship 
between revolution and legality.1  
Prof. Kay has greatly influenced, to my mind, constitutional law, 
constitutional theory, constitutional history, and comparative constitutional 
law, mainly in the areas of constitutional interpretation and the creation 
and change of constitutional orders.    
II. 
In his many studies, Prof. Kay explores fundamental questions of 
constitutional theory: what are the foundations of constitutional orders, 
what is their source of authority, and how they change. Thus, for example, 
Prof. Kay examined the paradox of illegality that produced the foundation 
of American constitutional order, explaining that within this paradox there 
is no contradiction because: 
[I]t is exactly its break with prior legality that invested the 
Constitution with the power it still exercises over us and with 
its, at least formal, primacy in our legal system. Moreover, 
this phenomenon is perfectly general. Every legal system is 
governed, at the end, by principles whose authority cannot be 
found in law.2 
Indeed, this is not unique to the American story; the binding nature of the 
constitution does not derive from a higher positive law but must be found 
in a non-legal occurrence. Accordingly, such non-legal rule is described by 
Prof. Kay as the “preconstitutional” rule.3 “At the end of the day,” Prof. 
Kay concluded one of his articles, “the authority of all law rests on a 
political foundation.”4 
The “preconstitutional rule is always provisional, subject to change 
when social and political factors require it,” Prof. Kay writes, because the 
legitimacy of the constitution changes over time and “is always a current 
matter.”5 Legitimacy changes over time because perceptions may change 
over time. And accordingly, the legitimacy of the constitutional authority 
itself may change over time: 
Authority involves an evaluation of the rightness of the 
constituent events. In this way, it incorporates what may be 
properly called moral reasons. This does not make its 
                                                                                                                     
1 See his full publication list in the final section of this Introduction.  
2 Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 57, 58 (1987). 
3 Richard S. Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 189–90 (1981). 
4  Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Change and Wade’s Ultimate Political Fact, 35 U. 
QUEENSLAND L.J. 31, 46 (2016).  
5 Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, supra note 2, at 80. 
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existence any less a fact but it is a certain kind of fact, one 
that includes the collective critical judgments of some 
number of individuals in certain times and places. It is this 
continuing normative attitude that distinguishes constituent 
authority from simple constituent power.6 
So, the idea (or the mere fact) of change is thus critical for the 
authority of the constitution and also to considerations of “constitutional 
fundamentals.”7 Since the social and political ‘pre-legal’ sources upon 
which law is built change over time, such changes are also manifested in 
the application and interpretation of law.8  
How constitutions endure and function over time is another (albeit 
related) question Prof. Kay has been exploring. He has written on the 
various mechanisms of constitutional change, such as formal mechanisms 
of constitution-making and constitution-amending, but also on informal 
mechanisms as constitutional interpretation.9 For Prof. Kay, these routes 
result in a different understanding of constitutional rules; constitutional 
rules intentionally created through formal constitutional change are 
different than “the rules that are attributed to the Constitution by courts 
and other public actors.”10 Prof. Kay’s scholarship thus deeply engages 
with the concept of time. He wrote of “Constitutional Chrononomy,” in 
which every constitution is forward-looking, in an attempt to guide and 
limit future governmental actions but also backward-looking, in order to 
comprehend the meaning and applicability of constitutional rules and 
limitations, mainly through courts’ interpretation, which is another major 
field of study by Prof. Kay.11 
                                                                                                                     
6 Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 721–22 (2011). 
7  Richard S. Kay, Comparative Constitutional Fundamentals, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 445, 466 
(1991). 
8  Id. at 447.  
9   See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, The Creation of Constitutions in Canada and the United States, 7 
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 111, 111 (1984) (comparing the process by which changes were made to the Canadian 
constitution in the 1980s with the institution of the United States constitution); Kay, Constituent 
Authority, supra note 6, at 117 (discussing the underlying authority for creating constitutions); Richard 
S. Kay, Formal and Informal Amendment of the United States Constitution, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 243 
(2018) (discussing formal and informal mechanisms for amending the United States Constitution).  
10  Richard S. Kay, Updating the Constitution: Amending, Tinkering, Interpreting, 67 DRAKE L. 
REV. 887, 888–89, 901–04 (2019). See also Richard S. Kay, Two Ways to Rewrite the Constitution, 
2015 WIS. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 25 (exploring two methods for rewriting the Constitution; “adopt[ing] a 
new text from scratch” and “maintain[ing] the existing text but . . . reinterpret[ing] its rules so as to 
make it better fit with modern realities”). 
11 Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS 31, 31–32 (2000). 
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III. 
Judicial interpretation has been a major focus of Prof. Kay’s work,12 
particularly developing the now dominant constitutional approach (with its 
various streams) to constitutional interpretation—originalism.13 
And Prof. Kay was described as “[t]he first academic defender of 
‘originalism’” after Paul Brest published his now well-known critique of 
originalism.14  
Prof. Kay is considered one of the most prominent and notable 
originalists, defending an original intention version of originalism, 
according to which (very simply put), judges should apply the rules of the 
Constitution “in the sense in which those rules were understood by the 
people who enacted them.”15 According to Prof. Kay, whereas we never 
know with full certainty the original intentions of authors, “it is almost 
always possible to examine the constitutional text and other evidence of 
intent associated with it and make a reasonable, good faith judgment about 
which result is more likely consistent with that intent.”16 
Prof. Kay’s seminal and widely cited article from 1988 on “Original 
Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication,”17 is a must-read for anyone 
interested in constitutional interpretation. Lee J. Strang describes this work 
as a “significant scholarly contribution[] to originalist theory.”18 Regarding 
this work, Randy E. Barnett wrote, “Richard Kay is one defender of 
originalism . . . who deserves special mention for the thoughtfulness and 
cogency of his analysis.”19 Or as Lawrence Solum described it: “an 
eloquent and well reasoned defense of originalism.”20 Further, Bret Boyce 
writes that “any consistent originalist theory must adopt something like 
                                                                                                                     
12  See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Judicial Policy Making and the Peculiar Function of the Law, 40 
CONN. L. REV. 1261 (2008) (exploring “the extent to which judges apply policy already embedded in 
legal rules or make fresh policy judgments in the course of deciding cases”). 
13  On the rise of originalism and its various streams, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and 
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 462–69 (2013); Joel Alicea, Forty Years of 
Originalism, 173 POL’Y. REV. 69, 69–76 (2012). 
14  Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of 
Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 9 n.30 (2018) (referring to Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the 
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980)).  
15 Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three 
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 230 (1987-1988). Kay’s defense of ‘original 
intention constitutional interpretation’ was elaborated and repeated in other publications, such as 
Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 703 (2009). 
16 Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions, supra note 15, at 244.  
17 Id.  
18  Lee J. Strang, The Most Faithful Originalist?: Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the Future 
of Originalism, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 873, 874 n.7 (2011). 
19 Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613 n.9 (1999).  
20 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1610 n.42 
(1988-1989). 
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Kay’s approach.”21 As Michael Perry concludes, when addressing the 
questions “[w]hat is originalism?” and “[w]hat is the best originalist 
approach?”, one can “hardly do better than to follow the lead of Richard 
Kay.”22 Accordingly, as elaborated below, we dedicate a substantive part 
of this special issue to the question of originalism and constitutional 
interpretation.  
IV. 
Finally, there is Prof. Kay’s contribution to comparative constitutional 
law. In 1976, Donald Kommers remarked that “comparative constitutional 
law . . . hardly exists as a taught discipline in the United States. . . . The 
state of affairs of comparative constitutional law is beginning to change, 
however.”23  
Indeed, nowadays, as part of ‘the renaissance of comparative 
constitutional law’ and its appearance as “the new frontier of constitutional 
law scholarship,”24 the place of comparative constitutional law in the 
United States is completely different from what Kommers described. Much 
of this, I believe, is thanks to scholars such as Richard Kay. Writing on 
issues and jurisdictions beyond the American constitutional landscape, 
including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Ireland, European 
Union, Hong Kong, and more, Kay’s scholarship was a refreshing voice, 
and one that influenced and inspired generations of scholars. Following in 
his footsteps, we aimed to include in this symposium comparativist 
constitutional law scholars from different jurisdictions who write in the 
tradition of Prof. Kay.  
V. 
The Issue includes contributions from various authors who are friends, 
colleagues, co-authors, students, or simply scholars admiring the work of 
Prof. Kay. It is structured as follows:  
The first section, includes articles that focus on the substantive themes 
related to Prof. Kay’s work. Starting, first, on questions surrounding 
                                                                                                                     
21 Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 954 
(1998). 
22 Michael J. Perry, Normative Indeterminacy and the Problem of Judicial Role, 19 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 375, 375 (1996) (referring to Richard S. Kay, “Originalist” Values and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 335 (1996)). 
23 Donald P. Kommers, The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. 
& PROC. 685, 685–86 (1976). On the disappearance of comparative constitutional law in American 
Law Schools after its rise in the first few decades after World War II, see David Fontana, The Rise and 
Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law in the Postwar Era, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2011).  
24  RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19 (2014).  
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constitution-making and constitutional change, Mikołaj Barczentewicz 
opens this section with his article Constituent Power and Constituent 
Authority that explores the relationship between Kay’s constituent 
authority, constituent power, and Hartian rules of recognition. Joel I. 
Colón-Ríos follows with Of Omnipotent Things, an article that develops a 
distinction between ‘constituent authority’ and ‘sovereignty,’ and applies 
these concepts to constituent assemblies. Then, in his Facts, Fictions and 
Other Artifices: “Constituent Authority” as the Work of Imagination, 
Zoran Oklopcic explores the relationship between constituent authority, 
beliefs, and fictions. Still on the question of constituent authority, Yaniv 
Roznai explores possible limitations on constitution-making power in his 
article The Boundaries of Constituent Authority.  
Moving to more comparative perspectives, in her article Ad Hoc 
Constitutional Reform in the UK, Alison Young explores the various 
constitutional changes that are taking place in the United Kingdom’s 
constitutional order. From a Canadian perspective, Warren J. Newman 
writes on Constitutional Chronometry, Legal Continuity, Stability and the 
Rule of Law: A Canadian Perspective on Aspects of Richard Kay’s 
Scholarship.  
Ending this section with a more intellectual history scholarship, Peter 
Oliver writes on RTE Latham and Change in the Ultimate Rules of a Legal 
System. And in his article Institutional Change and the Continuity of Law: 
An Essay in Tribute to Rick Kay, Peter L. Lindseth draws mainly on the 
work of the famous French institutionalist Maurice Hauriou.  
The next group of articles focuses on questions of legal and 
constitutional interpretation. Laurence Claus opens with Authority and 
Meaning, emphasizing the connection between legal meaning and legal 
status. Addressing the foundations of legal systems and legal 
interpretation, Larry Alexander writes on Connecting the Rule of 
Recognition and Intentionalist Interpretation: An Essay in Honor of 
Richard Kay. James Allan continues with The Special Kay Defence of 
Non-Originalist Judges: A Serial with an Unhealthy Final Ingredient. 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy then analyzes Legislative Intentions in Antonin 
Scalia’s and Bryan Garner’s Textualism. And writing on the challenges of 
interpreting constitutional provisions in light of original intentions or 
expectations, Mark Graber’s Original Expectations concludes this group 
of articles. Still in the realm of judicial review, Michael J. Perry’s Two 
Constitutional Rights, Two Constitutional Controversies, explores judicial 
controversies surrounding equal protection and the right to privacy. This 
section ends with Carol Weisbrod’s Brahmin Connections: A Note on the 
Vocation of the Law Professor. 
The second section includes a book review of The Glorious Revolution 
and the Continuity of Law (2014, The Catholic University of America 
Press), by Anthony W Bradley. 
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The third section includes a selection of shorter essays. This section 
opens with Aviam Soifer, with his article The Paradox of Texts and 
Constitutional Authority: For Rick Kay, Wallace Stevens Professor. It is 
then followed with Mark Weston Janis, Connecticut 1818: From 
Theocracy to Toleration. The final article: Rick Kay: And Now for the Rest 
of the Story by Richard D. Pomp—a long-time colleague of Prof. Kay at 
UConn Law—concludes this section with a personal view of Prof. Kay’s 
career.  
Finally, in section four, we have the privilege to include brief 
responses and thoughts by Richard S. Kay himself.  
Before ending, I wish to thank then Dean Timothy Fisher and 
Associate Deans Peter Siegelman and Leslie Levin for their support in 
organizing this special issue and the conference surrounding it, and 
Zitmarie Mestre and Deborah King for their organization of a successful 
academic event. And, above all, I wish to thank the wonderful editorial 
board of the Connecticut Law Review (Volume 52)—especially 
Editor-in-Chief Alexandria Madjeric, Managing Editor Adam J. Kuegler, 
and Assistant Managing Editor Hannah F. Kalichman, for their hard and 
dedicated work on this Issue. In the conference held at UConn School of 
Law on September 13, 2019 celebrating the work of Prof. Kay, he told the 
audience: 
The process of scholarship to me has been like writing notes, 
and then putting them in a bottle and sealing the bottle and 
tossing it over the side into the sea, in the hope, usually the 
vain hope, that someone somewhere will find that bottle, 
open it up and read what I said. 
He then thanked those in attendance for “noticing those bottles on the 
beach, picking them up, and taking a look.” Well, we thank you, Rick, for 
writing these notes and tossing these bottles. All the participants in this 
special issue, and many others, are grateful that we had the opportunity to 
learn from you and we are honored to pay tribute to one of the giants in our 
field. 
VI. PROF. RICHARD S. KAY’S PUBLICATION  
A. Books 
THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND THE CONTINUITY OF LAW (2014).  
 
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (3d ed. 2008) (with Anthony W. Bradley 
and Mark Janis). 
 
STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES (2005) (with International Academy of Comparative Law).  
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B. Articles  
1. Response to the Contributors, 52 CONN. L. REV. 1719–61 (2021). 
2. Updating the Constitution: Amending, Tinkering, Interpreting, 67 
DRAKE L. REV. 887–907 (2019).  
3. Democracy, Mixed Government and Judicial Review, in LAW 
UNDER A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY 199–226 (Lisa Burton Crawford, Patrick 
Emerton & Dale Smith eds., 2019).  
4. Formal and Informal Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 243–68 (2018).  
5. Examining Constitutional Transitions, 37 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 
(CAN.) 35–41 (2017).  
6. Construction, Originalist Interpretation and the Complete 
Constitution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1–25 (2017).  
7. Constitutional Change and Wade’s Ultimate Political Fact, 35 U. 
QUEENSLAND L.J. 31–46 (2016).  
8. Two Ways to Rewrite the Constitution, 2015 WIS. L. REV. ONLINE 
25–30.  
9. Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Judgments in American Law, in 
EVA STEINER, COMPARING THE PROSPECTIVE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL 
RULINGS ACROSS JURISDICTIONS 209–46 (2015) (abridged version 
published at 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 37–68 (2014)). 
10. Changing the United Kingdom Constitution: The Blind Sovereign, 
in SOVEREIGNTY AND THE LAW: DOMESTIC, EUROPEAN AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 98 (Richard Rawlings et al. eds., 
2013).  
11. Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715 (2011) (Turkish 
translation in CONSTITUTION MAKING AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE: PROSPECTS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN TURKEY 
49 (O. Ergül ed., 2011)).  
12. Constitutional Courts as “Positive Legislators” in the United 
States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 479–504 (2010) (with Laurence Claus).  
13. Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009).  
14. Judicial Policy Making and the Peculiar Function of Law, 26 U. 
QUEENSLAND L.J. 237 (2007), revised in 40 CONN. L. REV. 1261 
(2008).  
15. Causing Death for Compassionate Reasons in American Law, 54 
AM. J. COMP. L. 693 (2006), reprinted in EUTHANASIA IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 257–83 (M. 
Groenhuijsen & F. van Laanen eds., 2006), and in RIGHT TO LIFE 
AND RIGHT TO DEATH: A STUDY (A. Menon ed., 2007).  
16. Canada’s Constitutional Cul de Sac, 35 AM. REV. CAN. STUD. 705 
(2005).  
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17. Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues: A Comparative Analysis, 
in STANDING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 1 (R. Kay ed., 2005), reprinted in CONVERGENCE 
OF LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2006).  
18. The European Convention on Human Rights and the Control of 
Private Law, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 466 (2006).  
19. Michael Perry’s Right to Religious Freedom, 10 ROGER 
WILLIAMS L. REV. 427 (2005).  
20. Sir Thomas Jenner (1638–1707), OXFORD DICTIONARY OF 
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (2004). 
21. William Oldys (1636–1708), OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL 
BIOGRAPHY (2004). 
22. Rights, Rules and Democracy, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS 117–34 (Tom Campbell, Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy & Adrienne Stone eds., 2003). A revised version was 
published at 13 ESPAÇO JURÍDICO 151, 151–67 (2012).  
23. The Secession Reference and the Limits of Law, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 
327, 327–44 (2003). 
24. The European Human Rights System as a System of Law, 6 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 55, 55–71 (2000). 
25. William III and the Legalist Revolution, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1645, 
1645–64 (2000).  
26. Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS 31, 31–48 (2000).  
27. William B. Fisch & Richard S. Kay, The Constitutionalization of 
Law in the United States, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 437, 437–62 (Supp. 
1998).  
28. American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 16–63 (Larry Alexander ed., 
1998).  
29. Sovereignty in the New Hong Kong, 114 LAW Q. REV. 189, 189–
93 (1998).  
30. The Creation of a Legal System: European Human Rights, in 
MEMORY, HISTORY AND CRITIQUE: EUROPEAN IDENTITY AT THE 
MILLENNIUM: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH CONFERENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF EUROPEAN IDEAS 
AT THE UNIVERSITY FOR HUMANIST STUDIES, UTRECHT, THE 
NETHERLANDS, AUGUST 19–24, 1996 (F. Brinkhuis & E. Talmor 
eds., 1998).  
31. Legal Rhetoric and Revolutionary Change, 7 CARIBBEAN L. REV. 
161, 161–210 (1997).  
32. Jus Tertii Standing and Constitutional Review in Canada, 7 NAT’L 
J. CONST. L. 129, 129–69 (1997).  
33. “Originalist” Values and Constitutional Interpretation, 19 HARV. 
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 335, 335–41 (1996). 
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34. The Legitimacy of the Constitutional Judge and Theories of 
Interpretation in the United States, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 517–53 
(1994) (with William B. Fisch).  
35. The State Action Doctrine, The Public-Private Distinction, and the 
Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329–
60 (1993).  
36. The European Convention on Human Rights and the Authority of 
Law, 8 CONN. J. INT’L L. 217–25 (1993).  
37. The Canadian Constitution and the Dangers of Establishment, 42 
DEPAUL L. REV. 361–71 (1992).  
38. Comparative Constitutional Fundamentals, 6 CONN. J. INT’L L. 
445–75 (1991).  
39. Substance and Structure as Constitutional Protections: Centennial 
Comparisons, 1989 PUB. L. 428–39.  
40. Original Intentions, Standard Meanings and the Legal Character 
of the Constitution, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 39–50 (1989).  
41. Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional 
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 
226–92 (1988).  
42. The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 57–80 
(1987).  
43. Fairness and Function in the New York Tax Appeal System: 
Proposals for Reform, 49 ALB. L. REV. 352–402 (1985) (with 
Richard Pomp and Robert Plattner).  
44. The Jurisprudence of the Connecticut Constitution, 16 CONN. L. 
REV. 667–80 (1984).  
45. The Creation of Constitutions in Canada and the United States, 7 
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 111–63 (1984). 
46. Courts as Constitution-Makers in Canada and the United States, 4 
SUP. CT. L. REV. 23–41 (1982).  
47. Preconstitutional Rule, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187–207 (1981).  
48. The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court, 1873-1903, 29 
BUFF. L. REV. 667–725 (1980).  
49. Property Tax Exemptions and Alternatives: Constitutional 
Considerations, in GREATER HARTFORD CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR NON-PROFIT 
INSTITUTIONS: PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS (Richard D. Pomp ed., 
1978). 
50. Making Sense of the Prejudgment Seizure Cases, 64 KY. L.J. 705–
27 (1976) (with Harold Lubin).  
51. The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in 
Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. REV. 1–43 (1975).  
52. Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Non-Polar 
Approach, 61 GEO. L.J. 1401–24 (1973) (with Daniel Segal).  
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C. Book Reviews 
1. Book Review on Frankenberg, Comparative Constitutional 
Studies: Between Magic and Deceit (2018), 67 AM. J. COMP. L. 
694–99 (2018).  
2. Book Review on Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999), 7 EUR. 
LEGACY 247–48 (2002).  
3. Book Review on McAffee, The Written Constitution and Popular 
Sovereignty: The Founders’ Understanding (2000), 44 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 430–32 (2000).  
4. Book Review on Elazar, Covenant and Constitutionalism: The 
Great Frontier and the Matrix of Federal Democracy (1998), 5 
EUR. LEGACY 305–06 (2000).  
5. Book Review on Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: 
Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism (1993), 23 
AM. REV. CAN. STUD. 624–27 (1993). 
6. Book Review, 59 J. S. HIST. 349 (1993) (reviewing 1 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993)). 
7. Book Review, 22 AM. REV. CAN. STUD. 619 (1992) (reviewing 
DAVID A.A. STAGER, LAWYERS IN CANADA (1990)).  
8. Book Review, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 515 (1991) (reviewing 
CALVIN C. JILLSON, CONSTITUTION MAKING: CONFLICT AND 
CONSENSUS IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1988)).  
9. Book Review, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 434 (1990) (reviewing 
RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: 
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION 
(1990)).  
10. The Bork Nomination and the Definition of “The Constitution”, 84 
NW. U. L. REV. 1190 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990)). 
11. Constitutional Cultures: Constitutional Law, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 
311 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1989)).  
12. Moral Knowledge and Constitutional Adjudication, 63 TUL. L. 
REV. 1501 (1989) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, 
POLITICS, AND LAW (1988)).  
13. Book Review, 4 CONN. J. INT’L L. 239 (1988) (reviewing DAVID 
B. SWINFEN, IMPERIAL APPEAL: THE DEBATE ON THE APPEAL TO 
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